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How can the use of “mutual trust and cooperation” in the NEC 3 
suite of contracts help collaboration? 
 
Abstract: The NEC 3 standard form of construction contract aims to 
promote collaboration. It hinges on the use of a particular phrase “mutual 
trust and understanding” which is largely undefined. Linking that to notions 
of good faith in contract, this paper explores how that meaning might be 
ascertained.  
“Collaboration” has been a hot topic in the construction industry since, at least, the 
publication of the Latham Report in 19941. It is of growing importance in other fields 
ranging from the way in which law teachers teach2  to the maximisation of recovery of 
oil and gas from the North Sea.3  
From a lawyer’s point of view, one of the key issues around collaboration remains 
unresolved: what does “collaboration” actually mean4 and can that meaning be 
captured in a contract’s terms? Much of the discussion on collaboration focuses on 
techniques and practices which align parties’ commercial approaches such as 
partnering and pain/gain share arrangements. Despite this, in the construction 
                                                            
1 Sir Michael Latham Constructing the Team: Joint Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the 
UK Construction Industry HMSO 1994  
2 Association of Law Teachers: 2016 Annual Conference Promoting Collaboration 
https://www.northumbria.ac.uk/about‐us/academic‐departments/northumbria‐law‐school/law‐
research/promoting‐collaboration‐2016/ accessed 13 July 2016 
3 UKCS Maximising Recovery Review: Final Report (February 2014) 
4 It is noteworthy that, in conducting a survey of how collaboration was developing in the offshore oil and gas 
industry, Deloittes left the meaning of “collaboration” as something for those taking part in the survey to 
decide – Geoff Gibbons Collaboration: What do we think it means? Energy Voice 8 March 2016 
https://www.energyvoice.com/opinion/103246/103246/ accessed 17 November 2016.  
2 
 
industry, parties’ underlying interests will still often push their fundamental objectives 
in opposite directions: the person paying for the work will want to spend as little as 
possible and the person being paid for the work will want to make as much money as 
they can. In UK construction, as indicated by the Latham report, this traditionally led 
to adversarial and inefficient contract practices  
This paper examines one mechanism in which “collaboration” might be contracted for 
in circumstances where there is no change to the traditional commercial structure and 
incentives of the parties but where, despite this, there is an attempt to work in a more 
collaborative way.  
That discussion will focus on the use of an obligation that parties “work together in a 
spirit of mutual trust and cooperation.” That phrase is recognised as facilitating 
collaboration by UK construction clients and contractors.5  
It will be looked at in the particular context of its place within the the New Engineering 
Contract (NEC) suite of contracts – in particular, their third edition (“NEC 3”).  That 
suite is relevant to the current discussion because it is has the encouragement of 
collaborative working at its heart – and its attempt to do so was endorsed by Latham.6  
The focus of this paper is therefore on the particular clause of the NEC 3 contract, 
10.1 which provides that the parties work together in a spirit of mutual trust and 
cooperation – and how that might be interpreted. That can then be taken as an 
example for the use of this sort of provision in other contracts. For example, para. 1 of 
Schedule 8 of the JCT 2011 Standard Form of Building Contract provides that parties 
                                                            
5 67% of clients and contractors who had adopted collaboration techniques said that the form which the 
collaboration took was “A contract that included the ethos of mutual trust and cooperation” p.14 NBS National 
Construction Contracts and Law Survey 2015  
6 Latham n. 1 at Chapter 5 
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“work with each other and with other project team members in a co-operative and 
collaborative manner, in good faith and in a spirit of trust and respect. To that end each 
shall support collaborative behaviour and address behaviour which is not 
collaborative”. For present purposes, it is notable that while the JCT 2011 suite, as a 
whole, does not have the same explicit “collaborative” ethos as the NEC 3 – that 
particular provision is headed “collaborative working”.  
So, focussing on the NEC 3, in order to progress that discussion, it is important to first 
of all discuss how that clause fits into the overall approach of the NEC 3 suite.  
Collaboration and the NEC 3 suite 
The success of the NEC 3 approach can be seen in its growing popularity for use in 
major UK construction projects7 and increasingly internationally.8 It should be noted 
that the NEC is not the most popular form in the UK – despite its growing reputation, 
but it is another mark of the growing desire for a ‘collaborative’ approach, that the new 
suite of the most popular form of building contract in the UK – the Joint Contracts 
Tribunal - has made it clear that it is looking to include “collaborative” provisions within 
the new 2016 suite of contracts which is in the process of being introduced at the time 
of writing.9 
The aim of the NEC 3 suite of contracts to promote collaboration is clear for example, 
in the preface to the Engineering and Construction Contract, it says:  
““Previously, standard form contracts were written mainly as legal documents 
best left in the desk drawer until costly and delaying problems had occurred 
                                                            
7 See case studies on the NEC website <https://www.neccontract.com/Case‐Studies> for details  
8 See e.g. Robert Horne NEC and the Global Market: World Domination Building Magazine 4 November 2011 
9 http://corporate.jctltd.co.uk/jct‐2016‐edition‐new‐features‐announced/  accessed 13 July 2016 
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and there were lengthy arguments about who was to blame. The language of 
NEC Contracts is clear and simple, and the procedures set out are all designed 
to stimulate good management. Foresighted collaboration between all the 
contributors to the project is the aim” 10[Emphasis added]11  
The NEC 3 supports the relational role of the contract through its goal of “stimulating 
good management” and is supported by the idea that this is not a document to be left 
in a drawer (but, by implication one to be read and used).  
In terms of contract theory, that flows within the theoretical ideas of the “relational 
contract.”12 That is, contracts where the relationship between the parties lasts for a 
longer period and that the underlying circumstances about which they are contracting 
can be subject to change. That is in contrast with the more traditional paradigm of the 
single one-off transaction. The nature of construction contracts aligns closely with that 
definition and so the focus will be on contracts in that sector.  
Detailed discussion of these sort of issues is beyond the scope of the present paper- 
beyond providing the broader context for the discussion on “mutual trust and 
cooperation”. The relational aspect of the NEC 3 suite, this has been discussed at 
length and in detail by McInnis.13 The key idea is that “The key thing is that the 
commercial relationship is the key – and the legal relationship informs that by setting 
expectations.”14 
                                                            
10 Dr Martin Barnes, Preface Engineering and Construction Contract, NEC 3 April 2013 
11 Humphrey Lloyd Some thoughts on NEC 3 2008 ICLR 468 at p. 470 
12 The work of MacNeil is particularly influential in this regard and the brief summary in Stone and Devenney 
the Modern Law of Contract (11th Ed, 2015 Routledge) at Chapter 1.6 pp13 – 15 is a useful summary.  
13 Arthur McInnis The New Engineering Contract: Relational Contracting, Good Faith and Cooperation – Part 1 
[2003] ICLR 128 (Part 1) and [2003] ICLR  289 (Part 2).  
14 In this context, there is an interesting discussion of the interaction of contract law theory and construction 
law in Matthew Bell, Contract Theorists: What did they ever for us in construction law? May 2016, D189 
available on www.scl.org.uk/papers. The present author hopes to explore the ideas set out here, in the context 
of the NEC in future work.  
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At the same time, if there is not an effective contractual arrangement standing behind 
the commercial relationship, matters can be difficult to resolve if the commercial 
relationship breaks down. One of the arguments against relational contracting is that 
the need for flexibility can mean a lack of commercial clarity.15 That has been argued 
not to be necessarily the case – or at least not as important a factor as it might be 
thought to be initially.16 
In “legal” terms, there are two principal ways in which the NEC3 contract (like others 
which promote collaboration) can be seen to promote collaboration.  
Firstly, the contract operates as a “project management manual rather than a set of 
rights and obligations”17 which tries to balance the rigidity of a framework with some 
flexibility in application in the relational process. The extent to which it might succeed 
at that is beyond the scope of this paper, but is relevant to the overall context in which 
the second feature will be discussed. 
That second feature is the express provision in the contract that the parties are to carry 
out their obligations in a spirit of ‘mutual trust and cooperation.’ This attempts to 
capture the need for trust – which is recognised as vital in a collaborative 
relationship.18  
The meaning of this provision is, however, unclear – and that could cause problems. 
In order to help the parties build their relationship, it is necessary to try and develop 
an understanding of the requirements of that sort of clause.  
                                                            
15 It is a truism that businesses prefer certainty to uncertainty  
16 David Campbell Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the Relational Contract  2014 MLR 475 at pp 488 ‐ 490 
17 Tweet by @theNBS, 7 October 2014 from #whichcontract conference.  
18 See e.g. The role of trust in business collaboration Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008 
www.wroldwide.biz/legacy/downloads/role_of_trust.pdf accessed 11 November 2016; Prusak “The one thing 
which makes collaboration work” Harvard Business Review, 5 July 2011.  
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Mutual trust and cooperation. 
While there needs to be a framework for collaboration, there also needs to be flexibility.  
In this context, then – what does the obligation to work together in a spirit of “mutual 
trust and cooperation” mean that the parties have to do?  
Despite the attempts to capture the parties obligations in a ‘plain English’ style in the 
NEC 3 contract, it remains the fact that some ideas are expressed using terms that 
are, at best, ambiguous. The use of imprecise wording is, obviously, a common feature 
of legal drafting: the “use of such clauses legitimises ad hoc but reasoned choices in 
a borderline case.”19 That is a well-known and familiar process. Some terms (in 
particular “reasonable”) are commonly used for this reason. However, there is a 
danger when newer imprecise (or “open textured”) wording is used: the novelty and 
lack of clear understanding of the term mean that it may not have enough of the 
“precisely appropriate degree of imprecision”20 necessary to provide parties with 
certainty as to what is required from them.  
As has been highlighted before, some vagueness might be acceptable in terms of 
bolstering a commercial relationship but if that relationship breaks down, the parties 
would be advised to have an enforceable and clear contract to fall back upon.21  
Working out how to remove some of the open textured language is therefore important. 
That is done, firstly, by reference to the wider common law discussions on these issues 
and then by discussing it in the context of the theoretical position.  
The position of “good faith” in the UK jurisdictions 
                                                            
19 Farrar “Law Reform and the Law Commission” (1974) Sweet and Maxwell) pp.44 – 45. Highlighted by Justin 
Leslie.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Echoing Campbell n. 16 and Mason n. 43 below.  
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“Mutual trust and cooperation” can be treated as meaning something similar to 
behaving in “good faith” in English law.22 The general idea in both attempts to capture 
an open textured idea around standards of conduct and behaviour. Notwithstanding 
the different words used, the general thrust of the ideas is close enough to allow 
discussion to treat them as broadly equivalent for present purposes.  
Despite recent developments in the discussion of “good faith” in case law that phrase 
remains something which does not have a particularly clear meaning in either English 
or Scottish law. Recent case law in England on similar clauses and “good faith” means 
that it is worth reflecting on where that leaves the positon at present and then on how 
that means the phrase, in the NEC or in any “collaborative” contract, might be used.  
The position of good faith has been discussed at length elsewhere and the tendency 
to treat “good faith” as a synonym for another value laden word such as “honesty” or 
“fairness”. 23 That does not necessarily aid parties understanding of what is required 
of them. Thus, while “good faith” is not unknown in the UK common law24, but it is 
problematic. The problem is that the usage of the term in the NEC contract appears to 
be trying to give force to a concept which, while not unknown in the UK – does not 
have an established definition or meaning.  
This is not to suggest there is particular need for concern, per se, in the admission of 
good faith into UK law at some point. The eventual outcomes which arise in 
jurisdictions with, and without, accepted notions of good faith are often broadly 
                                                            
22 See e.g. discussion by Shy Jackson “Good faith revisited” (2014) Const LJ 379 at p.379 and referring, in 
particular to the clause in the case of Compass Group UK and Ireland Limited (t/a Medirest) v Mid Essex 
Hospital Services NHS trust 2013 EWCA Civ 200.  
23 Chitty on Contracts (32nd Edition) – section 55(C) “A principle of good faith or of contractual fairness” paras. 
1.039 to 1.056 sets out the English position and the Scottish position is well discussed in Hector MacQueen 
“Good faith in the Scots law of contract: an undisclosed principle?” in ADM Forte Good Faith in contract and 
property law (Hart Publishing, Oxford (1999)) (pages 5 – 37)   
24 Used advisedly to cover the various UK jurisdictions 
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similar.25 However the concern can perhaps be put down instead to “the fear of the 
potential of good faith as a tool to police the contract and impose a regulatory 
outcome”26 rather than actually assisting the management of the contract. There is a 
moral quality to the idea of good faith (as will be discussed below) and lack of 
understanding of what the phrase entails heightens the fear that conduct may be 
judged against uncertain principles; rather than the terms of the contract.  
Outside of the construction law context, and in Scotland, memories of the decision in 
Smith v Bank of Scotland plc27 are fresh enough to mean that any attempts to widen 
the present, narrow, usage of good faith beyond specific contracts (such as insurance) 
are treated with reluctance.  
In the case of Smith, a spouse signed a joint guarantee of a loan made to the other 
spouse by the Bank. That loan was secured over the matrimonial home. When the 
loan was defaulted upon, the Bank called up the security. The “innocent” spouse 
resisted this. In England, equitable principles would have acted to protect the innocent 
spouse’s position – but there were no such rules in Scots law. However, perhaps 
feeling that this led to an unfair result for the innocent spouse, the court said that the 
Banks’ duty of good faith meant that it had to ensure that the innocent spouse was 
fully informed of the risks involved in signing up to securities. 28 
This result was met with significant academic criticism. 29 The extent of the use of good 
faith was not clear. A number of fundamental issues about this new usage needed to 
                                                            
25 Dr Severine Saintier discusses the different approaches between civil and common law  in The Elusive notion 
of good faith in the performance of a contract, why still a bête noire for the civil and the common law in (2016) 
JBL (forthcoming);   
26 Ibid at p. 11 and 12 (of the article, published references TBC) 
27 1997 SC (HL) 111, [1997] UKHL 26.   
28 1997 SC(HL) 111 at 121D 
29 The literature is well summarised and discussed in Sandra Eden Cautionary tales – the continued 
development of Smith v Bank of Scotland 2003 Edin LR 1107 at pp 114 ‐ 118 
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be resolved: was it to apply to all spouses? What about analogous relationships 
(cohabitees? Partnerships?) What about relationships with some similar features to a 
married couple but not all? Was it just to apply to banks or all businesses? What steps 
did the bank have to take to discharge its duty of good faith? How much was it going 
to cost them?  
The eventual result is that the position is now relatively restricted to similar positions 
to the one in Smith – and that the burdens of ensuring the relevant information and 
advice have been managed into the banking system. However, it took a number of 
years and a number of judicial decisions for this position to be clarified, creating a 
period of uncertainty while the parameters of the new requirements become more 
clearly established. During that period, there was scope to delay resolution of disputes 
through the deployment of novel but previously untested arguments.  
This demonstrates the risks involved in letting a novel idea “loose” into a legal system 
without providing clarity over how it will operate. 
A similar process can currently be seen to be underway in England following the 
decision in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corp Ltd.30  
In Yam Seng, the court was willing to recognise that an implied  provision of good faith 
might have effect in English law (and citing Smith in support of that proposition, among 
others) – where the contract was “relational”. 31 In that case, the good faith obligation 
was said to mean that parties were to be honest in their dealings in such a contract 
and a false statement therefore gave rise to a breach of the implied term of good faith.  
                                                            
30 2013 EWHC 111(QB); 2013 All ER (Comm) 1321, [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) 
31 Ibid at para. 142 
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This decision is interesting in the context of the NEC 3 which seems to consider itself 
as “relational” in some ways – although the “good faith” obligation in the NEC 3 is 
expressly provided for, rather than implied.  
The circumstances in which the good faith obligation could be implied were relatively 
narrowly defined in Yam Seng– and looked at situations where parties would have a 
relationship over time, among other things.32 That assessment could, of course, apply 
to a range of potential commercial relationships (including construction projects) and 
so, as there was with the Smith decision, there have been further actions in court, and 
decisions aimed at clarifying and developing position set out in Yam Seng.  
These subsequent decisions have tended to try and avoid defining good faith – and, 
take a restrictive interpretation where the phrase has been used in a contract.   
The most important recent case is Compass Group UK and Ireland Limited (t/a 
Medirest) Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust.33 That decision related to the 
decision making process for the award of incentives under a contract for services in a 
hospital and has been subject to considerable commentary already.34  The scope of 
good faith type obligations has been restricted by that decision since the key 
contractual provisions were to be interpreted without needing to refer to the “good 
faith” type obligation. As a result, the meaning of good faith obligations provided for in 
contracts remains unclear.   
                                                            
32 Ibid. 
33 2013 EWCA Civ 200 
34 See in particular the discussions of this case in context in Jackson Good Faith revisited  2014 Const LJ 379 and 
Jan van Dunne On a clear day, you can see the continent ‐ the shrouded acceptance of good faith as a general 
rule of contract law on the British Isles 2015 Const LJ 3 
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The case of Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highway Ltd35 which had a similar 
factual basis to Medirest and had the benefit of considering and glossing that 
judgement. The position thereby seems to be  
1. Good faith is not usually implied into English law contracts – but can be made 
express.36 
2. There is no “freestanding” duty of good faith in English law – where there is a 
contract provision attempting to import good faith, then this is to be read along 
side other provisions.37 
3. Those other provisions will be deemed to exclude the good faith duty where 
they are clear in what is required38 or where another value is given to inform 
the nature of the obligation.  
In terms of where this leaves the NEC contract – or any collaborative contract with a 
“good faith” type obligation where it can be said to exist is unclear. The courts seem 
to be avoiding dealing with the matter head on, as yet. 
 
This means that there is still the risk of using good faith – as Saintier terms it – as a 
method of “policing the contract”39 and attempting to impose a particular interpretation 
rather than giving effect to the parties’ arrangements. Since Yam Seng, and speaking 
extra-judicially, Legatt LJ has pointed out that in the UK, the understanding of the 
“good faith” is drawn from the parties’ contract – rather than a broader understanding 
of the position (which then sounds in issues of policy and in pre-contractual 
                                                            
35 2015 EWHC 1969 (TCC) 
36 Ibid at para. 81 
37 Ibid at para. 96 (quoting from Mid Essex with approval).  
38 Ibid at para. 83 and 93 
39 See reference at n. 26 
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discussions).40 As Legatt also points out (chiming with the points discussed about the 
role of the commercial contract, above) that commercial parties operate their 
agreements with a degree of flexibility and cooperation – in the normal course of 
things.41 It is against this that he feels contractual intentions would be supported by 
having regard to values of good faith.42  
 
The key issue, therefore, is to try and ascertain what the contractual position of good 
faith might mean in the context of a collaborative construction contract, which makes 
express provision for it.  
 
The preliminary point to make is that much of the discussion tends to suggest that 
“good faith” means something like “honesty” or “fair dealing” or the opposite of “bad 
faith”43 (Legatt J takes this view in his lecture44 and also looks at the use of good faith 
as it applies to parties’ use of their discretion45). However, this runs the risk of replacing 
one open textured phrase with others – and not capturing the essential meaning of the 
phrase.  
 
In particular, if the meaning of good faith in the context of a collaborative contract such 
as the NEC 3 is to import an idea of transparency or honesty – then it might lead to a 
question as to why there was a need to include complex and detailed provisions for 
                                                            
40 Leggatt J Contractual duties of good faith Lecture to the Commercial Bar Association, 18 October 2016 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp‐content/uploads/2016/10/mr‐justice‐leggatt‐lecture‐contractual‐duties‐of‐
faith.pdf accessed 18 November 2016 at pp 2 and 3.  
41 Ibid at pp. 7 ‐ 10 
42 Ibid at p.18 
43 See e.g. Steyn Contract law: fulfilling the reasonable expectations of honest men (1997) LQR 433 and Tan 
Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐ Yam Seng and Bhasin (2016) JBL 420 
44 Leggatt J n. 40 at p. 9  
45 Ibid pp.12 ‐ 15 
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the exchange of information within the contract itself.46 In terms of the case law, that 
would serve to limit the usefulness of the provision.  
 
Furthermore, this sort of definition and explanation works best where the “good faith” 
type of obligation is implied. Specific wording was chosen in the NEC 3. If the parties 
wanted “honesty” – then they could have provided for that.  
 
Drawing on the existing case law, there might appear to be two particular options as 
to how to explore the interpretation of this clause. These are set out below but, as will 
be shown; neither is a particularly definitive answer to the question of interpretation. A 
further option will then be explored.   
 
1. Acting as a rhetorical reminder47 
 
Mason surveyed the operation of good faith in English law before the recent case law 
developments discussed above.48 In that survey, he generally identified the impact 
“good faith” had as being one of emphasizing or allowing access to existing remedies 
under contract law. That tends towards a view that the difficulties in defining good faith 
in English law arise in part from the fact that it is inherent in the approach to 
enforcement of obligations already, since English law is based on ideas of good faith.49 
                                                            
46 For example the “Compensation Events” provisions in clause 6 
47 Or “mood music” as termed by Mike Barlow, see David Mosey Love and Understanding Building, Tuesday 15 
November 2016 www.building.co.uk/nec‐contracts‐love‐and‐understanding accessed 15 November 2016. Its 
interesting to reflect on the prominence of the “mutual trust..” clause within the NEC 3: where it is very much 
at the forefront of the contractual documents compared with the JCT SBC equivalent which is buried in the 
eighth schedule of the standard form. Legally, there may be no difference, if the provisions are incorporated 
into the contract but there is a significant presentational difference.  
48 Brian Mason Good faith clauses in construction contracts: fine sentiments in search of substance [2011] ICLR 
5, 
49 Ibid at. pp 16 ‐ 25 
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In this situation “such [good faith] provisions will express the parties aspirations which 
they may wish to regularly reaffirm throughout the course of their projects”50  
 
Jackson echoes this when he says: “The cases suggest that such clauses will be 
relevant in limited factual circumstances but the real benefit of such clauses will be in 
reinforcing the message that collaborative conduct is required when carrying out 
contractual obligations” 51 
  
At its heart, this analysis suggests that the wording in the contract is to act as a way 
of reminding the parties of their overall approach to the contract and therefore as a 
tool to persuade them of their need to behave “properly”; rather than having ‘purer’ 
contractual force in terms of its enforceability.  
 
That “reminder” effect can have real value in discussions between the parties to the 
contract – and in setting expectations for the commercial relationship which is, it must 
be remembered, at the heart of the collaborative and relational contract.52 However, 
as will be clear – and as Mason goes on to say53 - while it is of use in the legal context 
where clarity of language and obligations exist in part to reinforce the commercial 
relationships; it does rather beg the question of why such a phrase would be included 
in the contract if the parties had not intended for it to have some legal obligatory force.  
 
                                                            
50 Ibid at. p.26 
51 Jackson n.34 at p. 389 
52 As discussed by McInnis n. 13 
53 Mason n. 48 at p. 26 continues “At worst [good faith obligations] will obfuscate a contract’s interpretation 
such that the parties’ agreed risk allocation may not be enforced”  
15 
 
There would be other ways to try and achieve this “rhetorical” effect– through the use 
of protocols or other extra-contractual means. Alternatively, parties could have spelled 
out the level of force which the term was to have as part of the provision itself. Without 
these, it might be assumed that if the parties have used these words in their contract 
for a reason – especially in the context of a standard form where the wording is the 
product of careful consideration by panels of experts. This therefore suggests that the 
provision ought to have further meaning – and some sort of contractual force.  
 
2.  “Due Process” 
 
The recent trend in the case law is for the contract to be interpreted in order to maintain 
“faithfulness to the agreed common purpose”54– with a view to allowing parties to make 
claims based on language which might previously have been considered too vague. 
This is seen clearly in the case of Emirates Trading Agency LLC v Prime Mineral 
Exports Pte Ltd55, where an obligation to have “friendly discussions” was held to be 
enforceable. The criteria for this were that the obligation was:  
 
“The agreement was not incomplete; no term was missing. Nor is it uncertain; 
an obligation to seek to resolve a dispute by friendly discussions in good faith 
has an identifiable standard, namely, fair honest and genuine discussions 
aimed at resolving a dispute. Difficulty of proving a breach in some cases 
should not be confused with a suggestion that a clause lacks 
                                                            
54 To adapt the title from Henry Hoskins Contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith: faithfulness to the 
agreed common purpose (2014) LQR 131 
55 [2015] 1WLR 1145; [2014] EWHC 2104 (Comm) 
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certainty…commercial men expect the court to enforce obligations which they 
have undertaken”56. 
 
Similar decisions have held that there is an obligation to take steps to procure a 
collateral warranty (see Liberty Mercian v Cuddy57) and in Scotland to use “reasonable 
endeavour” to procure performance of obligations.58  
 
This suggests firstly that the courts would try and give effect to the parties’ contractual 
intention – if they could.  
 
It also suggests, secondly, that the courts may try and treat the interpretation of the 
“mutual trust and cooperation” provision in terms of the extent to which it is clear and 
something by which attempts to carry out these obligations can be measured.  
 
This approach would seem to solve the problem of how such provisions are to be 
interpreted. However, without further explanation these good faith/mutual trust terms 
are likely to be considered to be too “open textured” to allow a proper assessment of 
whether their requirements have been complied with. The Emirates Trading and 
Liberty Mercian cases mentioned above turned on the fact that there were clear 
intended potential outcome against which progress could be assessed. So – if “friendly 
discussions” are the intention – the existence or not of discussions can be identified. 
If a collateral warranty is to be provided, the steps which might be taken to reach that 
                                                            
56 Ibid at para. 64 
57 Liberty Mercian Limited v Cuddy Civil Engineering Limited and others [2014] EWHC 3584 (TCC) 
58 R&D Construction Limited v Hallam Land Management Limited 2010 CSIH 96 and Kier Construction Limited v 
WM Partnership LLP [2016] CSOH 17 
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can be identified. It is less clear what might constitute “cooperation” – at least to the 
extent of what is “enough” cooperation to meet the contractual requirement.  If that is 
true for “cooperation” it must be even more the case for “trust” and for “good faith” 
more generally.  
 
Again, too, the position must be that if there was a desire to provide for a process – 
then it was open to the parties to set out clearly what that process is.  
 
Since these issues remain unclear, it is therefore important to try and set out the 
framework for assessing what these mean. In doing so, it is worth considering some 
of the principles which lie behind discussions of good faith. These might then be able 
to draw out some lessons for inclusion in collaborative contracts.  
 
Framework for assessment 
 
In carrying out this task, it is worth considering the categorisations of “good faith” or 
the source of “good faith” by Wightman which are helpful in constructing that 
framework.59  
 
Wightman categorises good faith to be either “core”60, “contextual”61 or “normative.”62 
All of these of these might come into play in the present example of the collaborative 
construction contract.  
                                                            
59 John Wightman Good faith and pluralism in the Law of Contract  in  Brownsword, Hird and Howells (eds) 
Good faith in Contract: Concept and Context  
60 Ibid. p. 42 
61 Ibid at pp 42 44.  
62 Ibid at. pp 44 – 46. 
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“Core” good faith 
 
Wightman does not provide significant discussion on this aspect of good faith but 
suggests it is the “minimum standards of honesty in the formation of contract”. 63 These 
seem to be those values which are inherent in the English (and Scottish) legal 
systems.64 Wightman identifies this type of good faith as a means of distinguishing it 
from the two categories which follow rather than as a topic for separate discussion. 
For present purposes, that must be assumed that the express inclusion of a good faith 
type obligation in a contract is aimed at doing more than reflecting the inherent values 
of the system.   
 
“Contextual” good faith 
 
Outline 
 
Wightman identifies contextual good faith as being something which is assessed in 
the specific context of the contract in question. Like the outline put forward by Steyn65 
– it reflects the parties’ expectations as to how each of them will carry out their 
obligations under the contract: “it is concerned with making parties live up to the actual 
standards of the contracting community of which they are members”66 
 
                                                            
63 Ibid. at p. 42 
64 See discussion at n. 23 and also Brownsword Positive, Negative, Neutral: the Reception of good faith in 
English Contract Law in Brownsword, Hird and Howells (eds) Good faith in Contract: Concept and Context 
65 Steyn Contract Law: fulfilling the reasonable expectations of honest men (1997) LQR 433 
66 Wightman n. 59 at p. 42 
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This “community” is relatively specific and recognises that “in some contexts more 
restraint will be expected than in others, and so contextual good faith does not 
invariably require that parties act in a cooperative way: it will depend on the practices 
and understandings in their commercial sector”.  
 
Wightman identifies three criteria for the development of a particular contracting 
community  
 
1. A regular engagement in contracting in that area so that the “social relations 
necessary for the informal understandings to be shaped disseminated and 
become internalised cannot exist”67 
2. The bargaining position of the parties must be broadly aligned – otherwise the 
context for the relations will be weighted in one direction, rather than the other 
and “will not limit the pursuit of self interest by both sides”68 [emphasis added] 
3. The contract should be relational –in order that members have experience not 
just of operating the contracts but “handling problems when things go wrong”.69  
 
Wightman considers that this form of good faith would work best for commercial 
contracts. 70 That would seem logical.  
 
Analysis 
 
                                                            
67 Ibid at p.43 
68 Ibid at. p.44 
69 Ibid. p.44 
70 Ibid p.48 ‐ 52 
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There are a number of points which can be made here in relation to what Wightman 
says and the application of good faith in a collaborative construction contract such as 
the NEC 3. Most strikingly, this appears to be most in line with the reasoning of Leggatt 
LJ in Yam Seng. At para. 144 for example, Legatt J says “Although its requirements 
are sensitive to context, the test of good faith is objective in the sense that it depends 
not on either party’s perception of whether particular conduct is improper but on 
whether in the particular context the conduct would be regarded as commercially 
unacceptable by reasonable and honest people” 71 
 
Firstly, the three categories where Wightman “contextual good faith” might apply would 
broadly seem to exist in the typical construction contract. Most parties in a construction 
contract have some experience of what they are contracting for. While the parties 
bargaining positions can be significantly different, the use of a standard form of 
contract can be seen as balancing their interests to some extent. The contract is also 
recognisably ‘relational’ – as has been discussed above.  
 
There is therefore an argument that the key to an assessment of the meaning of ‘good 
faith’ or the similar provision in a collaborative construction contract might be to import 
an external value for evaluation such as “good industry practice” or “commercial 
sense” or some other equivalent recognised term.  
 
This would be interesting as it would also align ‘good faith’ and the more general rules 
for the interpretation of contracts as set out in the case law – which echoes these 
ideas. While the focus in the case law has been on the idea of “commercial common 
                                                            
71 Yam Seng n. 30 at para. 144 
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sense”, the underlying idea of looking at the context of the contract would not be far 
away.  
 
Leggatt J makes this link in Yam Seng72 and Tan has placed the development of good 
faith in this “contextualist” position73 the idea of interpreting ambiguous wording within 
commercial contracts with “commercial common sense” can clearly be seen in the 
decision of the UK Supreme Court in Rainy Sky v Kookmin74.  This would support the 
idea of contextual good faith as the appropriate framework for interpretation of these 
sorts of provision but there are a number of problems which prevent that being 
appropriate.  
 
Firstly,  the UK Supreme Court have recently stepped back from the Rainy Sky 
judgment and the more “contextualist” approach, to some extent in the decisions of 
Arnold v Britton75 and Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas76. In doing so, they have re-
emphasised the need to look at the terms of the contract a more “formalist” approach77.  
That stepping back suggests the courts may be less keen to “read in” good faith ideas 
from the context of the commercial arrangements – and therefore undermines the 
basis for Yam Seng, to some extent.  
 
                                                            
72 See n. 25 at para. 139 
73 Zhong Zing Tan Keeping faith with good faith? The evolving trajectory post‐Yam Seng and Bhasin (2016) 
JBL420 at 427 
74 2011 UKSC 50 per Lord Clarke at e.g. para. 21. This decision is expressly name checked in Yam Seng at para. 
139 
75 [2015] UKSC 63 
76 [2015] UKSC 72 
77 See e.g. Tan n.73 at p.426 
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However, the point about the use of a “commercial common sense” interpretation as 
an aid to dealing with unclear contract terms could still be important in the case of the 
interpretation of “good faith” wording, which is intrinsically unclear, in this context.  
 
Secondly, even allowing for a contextual interpretation, there must be doubts about 
whether this would provide an answer to this issue.  
 
This is because, if the parties were intending for their contract to be interpreted in line 
with “commercial common sense” or “good industry practice” or a similar contextual 
meaning, they could have said so in their contract. Alternatively if the contextual rule 
reflects the common law, then there must be doubt as to whether they need to make 
such a specific provision: rather than leaving it up to an application of the common law 
canons of interpretation. Adding a particular clause of difficult to determine meaning 
to the contract does not do too much to assist the positon.  
 
So, it might therefore be said that the parties were looking to do something more by 
adopting a specific term than provide for a canon of interpretation.  
 
Furthermore, while at first glance the three criteria identified by Wightman apply here, 
there must be questions about the extent of that application to the NEC 3 suite and 
construction contracts more generally.  
 
In particular, if the aim of the provision is (at least partly) to promote collaboration, 
there are questions about whether an appropriately “collaborative” context for the 
interpretation of “good faith” applies in the UK construction industry. Full understanding 
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of the provision might require a culture of collaboration against which parties conduct 
can be measured. Moreover, even if it does exist in UK construction, it is even more 
questionable whether it would be understood outside of that sector. Wightman 
identifies that one criteria for the contextual approach is that the parties have access 
to some sort of external mechanisms for understanding how problems are resolved. It 
is not clear if this can be said to exist in terms of the current extent of collaborative 
working in the UK. .  
 
Finally, while Wightman considers that the commercial sector is the appropriate 
paradigm for a contextual good faith contract – he says that personal contracts might 
be appropriate for the other category of “good faith”.78 Since there are elements of the 
collaborative working relationship which surely resemble a personal relationship more 
than a traditional commercial transaction; it is worth sketching out the alternative which 
Wightman details, namely “normative” good faith.  
 
Normative good faith  
 
Outline 
 
In contrast to contextual good faith, Wightman sees normative good faith as a “canon 
of contractual justice imposed on the parties.”79 Among the examples cited are the 
framework of requirements in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations. 
80The restrictions imposed on commercial companies in these regulations is not 
                                                            
78 Wightman n.59. Discussed pp 48 ‐ 57 
79 Ibid. at p.45 
80 1994/3159 (which were replaced by Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999/2083 and which 
are now subsumed within the Consumer Rights Act 2015) 
24 
 
something which has developed from their commercial practice but the judgement of 
“unfairness” is, instead made in the terms of the regulations themselves. It comes from 
outside of the parties own understanding.  
 
Wightman points out that there is, naturally, a cross over between the two 
classifications of good faith – and that contextual good faith has the benefit of being 
something which can be drawn from the parties’ intentions. 81 
 
By contrast, normative good faith has an external source. This can be a set of rules or 
ethics – or “institutional rules” for a particular aggregation of people.82 
 
Analysis 
 
This type of good faith is by nature harder to assess but probably more closely reflects 
the natural, lay, understanding of “good faith” where people assess the meaning of the 
term by reference to a particular code of ethics or morals or internal sense of “good”.  
 
The difficulty with that approach is that it can lead to disputes where one person’s 
subjective understanding of the requirement of good faith does not meet another’s 
standards. In this situation, the perceived failure to act in good faith can actually act to 
corrode the relationship more quickly as it may have created the perception that a 
higher standard was being operated to. It is the negative side of the “rhetorical 
reminder” effect of the “good faith clause”. One party might expect that in a traditional 
                                                            
81 Wightman n.59 at p.46 
82 Ibid. at p. 53 
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contract, parties would act in their own narrow and adversarial interests – but where 
there is an obligation of “good faith” or similar in the contract it gives rise to a higher 
expectation.83  
 
This bolsters the need for clarity on what good faith means. It is in this sort of situation, 
it is suggested, that there is most risk of good faith being used to “police” the parties.84  
 
If a “personal,” subjective, understanding of good faith is not enough, however, the 
question arises as to where the meaning is to come from. It maybe that certain 
institutions (religious, social or otherwise) can provide that meaning. In personal 
contracts, where there is not the same opportunity to create a “contracting community” 
which can develop its own understandings and rules, these “institutions” can provide 
this understanding, either by helping govern inter-personal relationships between 
members of the institution or as acting as a framework to protect individuals engaging 
with the particular activities (such as consumer protection laws). 85 
 
The idea of institutional rules is weaker in the commercial sphere when there are fewer 
parties operating in a particular ‘space’ (since activities are tied to particular projects 
or transactions) and there is not the same opportunity for understandings to develop 
on how to operate within the rules of the institution, over the longer term. Institutional 
rules are often enforced informally by other members of the institution – but that tends 
to mean an acceptance of the authority (at least in limited circumstances) of one of the 
institution. That acceptance is less likely to arise where parties have competing 
                                                            
83 Ibid. at p. 52 – 56 for discussion of calculability which feeds into this idea.  
84 See n. 26 
85 Ibid. see p.52 ‐ 57 
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commercial objectives. At the same time, the relational aspects of construction 
contracts and the relative novelty of “collaborative” working do suggest that there might 
be a need for an institutional framework to be imposed. That leaves the questions of 
where those institutional codes come from and how they come to be accepted and 
then interpreted by the parties.  
 
Where does this leave us? 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the discussion above. 
 
1. There is a tension in the case law between increasingly open attempts to rely 
upon good faith and similar categories of obligation and the hesitancy of the 
courts to deal with precisely what it means. 
 
2. While good faith type obligations have importance in terms of managing the 
parties expectations in a commercial/rhetorical sense – those expectations 
ought to be something which can be given effect to.  
 
3. Current case law suggests that the courts ought to be willing to give effect to 
these expectations but they find it difficult to engage with the particular 
provisions which act to impose good faith across a contract.  
 
4. This means we do not have a clear understanding of what “good faith” or 
“mutual trust and cooperation” means in a collaborative construction contract.  
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5. Considering the discussion of good faith in the more theoretical context 
provided by Wightman suggests that there is a need to identify a source of the 
values upon which the interpretation of good faith can be evaluated.  
 
6. If an external set of values and rules is to be applied, there are difficulties in 
working out where this might come from. Collaborative construction contracts 
do not fit clearly into either paradigm offered by Wightman.  
 
7. The source of the framework or context to interpret “good faith” in collaborative 
contract still needs to be worked out – especially where it applies to a sector 
which is still working to improve collaborative working.  
 
One answer which would work specifically for the NEC 3 contract is that its theme and 
aims are clear enough to create a “context” on their own – for example by using the 
words of the preface set out above to guide behaviour, and along the lines of the 
“rhetorical reminder” which sets parties a goal as to their conduct. The NEC creates a 
clear drive to “collaboration” and so the answer to the issue of interpretation is to deal 
with the most collaborative approach.  
 
At the same time, that tends to rely on similarly vague aspirations and so there is still 
value in attempting to bring further clarity to the wording in the NEC 3 can also serve 
to assist collaboration – and may also have lessons for other collaborative contracts 
which do not have such a clearly defined scheme for working together.  
 
Identifying the context 
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The present writer’s favourite example of collaboration is the British and Irish Lions 
Rugby team and, in particular the example of their successful tour to South Africa in 
1997, where the Lions defeated the then-reigning World Champions, South Africa. 
One of the keys to the success of that tour was put down to the early steps which the 
tour management team took to allow the players to define for themselves what the 
code of conduct for the tour would be. The players identified some rules of conduct for 
themselves.86  
 
In the context of the current discussion, this code of conduct could be seen to be along 
similar lines to the institutional rules which might underpin good faith or – more broadly 
and when considered with the other activities on the team building trip as accelerating 
the process of creating a context under which the “contextual good faith” could be 
understood.  
There are further benefits in terms of expectations and relationship building which go 
beyond issues of legal enforceability. Agreeing these documents ought to be 
something that engages those who will be doing the work, for example, rather than 
being something which is done in an overly formal way. It was seen as an important 
part of the Lions’ success.   
 
Such drafting and creation of codes of practice is, of course, common in commercial 
settings – and applies in construction projects too. The JCT, for example, has a 
                                                            
86 Neil Merrick “The Lion’s Share” People Management 12 June 1997  
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standard form of partnering charter that provides some detail of how parties in a 
partnering contract are to interact.  
 
In terms of the legal standing of these documents, a Partnering Charter was looked at 
in the case of Birse Construction Limited v St David Ltd. 87. This charter contained a 
number of obligations – including one to operate with “mutual trust and understanding”. 
In this case, the charter stood outside the parties’ principal contract and so was used 
by the judge as a means to understand and measure the parties’ behaviour. The 
precise way in which this was to operate is not the subject of detailed consideration in 
the report but it is clear that the judge considers that the Charter allowed for some 
flexibility or leeway in terms of the formalities of contractual formation. He also said  
 
“One would note expect, where the parties had made mutual commitments 
such as those in the Charter, either to be concerned about compliance with 
contractual procedures if otherwise there had been true compliance with the 
letter or spirit of the Charter. Even though the terms of the Charter would not 
alter or effect the terms of the contract (where they had not been incorporated 
or referred to in the contract or are not binding in law in their own right) an 
arbitrator or Court would undoubtedly take such adherence to the Charter into 
account in exercising the wide discretion to open up, review and revise etc. 
which is given under the JCT Conditions”88 
 
                                                            
87[1999] BLR 194 Thanks to RGU dissertation student, Duncan McBoyle, for flagging up this case 
88 Ibid at.p.203 
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This is helpful in terms of demonstrating that the Charter would be part of the 
contextual, factual matrix which could be used in giving effect to the contract. 
Questions remain where the partnering charter (as in the St David’s case) uses 
relatively vague and open textured words – of the kind discussed above. That requires 
an assessment of the spirit of the arrangement rather than providing a more concrete 
vehicle for assessing the parties understanding of its intentions. The steps identified 
in the Emirates Trading case above – where there needs to be sufficient certainty of 
the obligations in question to allow them to be enforced – may not therefore be met.   
 
Measurable milestones 
 
Accordingly, referring back to the idea expressed above about either creating a context 
or understanding of the values of a project or providing a set of institutional rules which 
might help understand and give effect to their understanding, this process – of 
agreeing a code of conduct or project charter would seem like an appropriate 
mechanism for developing this position.  
 
As part of that, parties acknowledge that there are obligations on them to cooperate 
and act with trust and good faith but are then obliged try and work out what that means 
in practice. This discussion would help set expectations – and could also create a 
framework to ascertain whether the “good faith” obligations have been complied with. 
 
The danger is that negotiating further documents just adds confusion rather than 
clarity. Construction projects are already often awash with paper work – and 
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construction contracts often have an array of protocols and other documents. As Tony 
Bingham has pithily put it:  
 
“Not only are there too many forms…it is a truism that the industry does not 
understand these “legal” documents. True too that our industry sees no point in trying 
to understand these legal documents; true too that if you spent time trying to fathom 
the true intention of the contractual bumf, you would have no time to build the 
building”89 
 
Clearly the aim of this exercise should be to ensure that the parties do understand the 
documents – and that include the meaning of terms such as “mutual trust and 
understanding”. But the warning of things getting lost among the array of contractual 
documents ought to be heeded.  
 
In order to add value therefore, the parties need to engage in the process and keep 
an eye on tangible results. One suggestion is that, for example, rather than capturing 
aspirations, the discussion focuses on identifying in more detail the sort of things and 
factors which should be taken into account. 
 
For example, parties might agree to deal with new risks along the lines of the 
Abrahamson principles for risk allocation such as: 
 
1. Identifying the party with the most control over the causes of the risk? 
                                                            
89 Tony Bingham Standard Form Contracts: What the Papers Say  Building Magazine, 2 November 2012  
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2. Identifying whether the risk can be transferred from one party to another – for 
example by using insurance? 
3. Identifying which party benefits most from the risk being controlled 
4. Identifying whether one party can manage the risk more efficiently? 
5. Identifying where the initial losses fall if the risk materialises?90 
The greater specificity of the discussions on this sort of feature not only help provide 
the agenda for any meeting which might be had to discuss a topic but also provide the 
sort of criteria against which progress can be assessed and evaluated. The extent to 
which parties engage on discussion of this level of detail is much easier to gauge 
rather than more abstract questions around whether the level of engagement was 
broadly “enough” or of the right standard.  
This would help allow the courts to assess compliance – along the lines of the authority 
in Emirates Trading.  
It also provides scope for the courts to assess whether action has been taken against 
the agreed standards of the parties. The courts have shown a willingness to look at 
these sort of documents –and so care should be taken to make them as appropriately 
clear as possible. 
 
Conclusion 
In terms of the lessons for collaborative contracting then, the approach of the NEC is 
instructive. The use of “mutual trust and cooperation” is linked to the collaborative 
approach – but the way in which this provision is to be interpreted remains unclear. 
                                                            
90 Paraphrased from Max Abrahamson Risk Management 1984  ICLR 241. Another model is put forward by 
Nael Bunni Four Criteria for  Risk Allocation in Construction Contracts 2009 ICLR 4 
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That means that it is difficult for the parties to have a framework to assess whether 
their actions are appropriate or not.  
The interpretation of this clause remains somewhat unclear at this stage, where the 
meaning of “good faith” in English (and Scottish) case law is unsettled. Steps have 
been outlined above which might help to add clarity to that. As well as possibly helping 
settle the legal position, they will be useful in terms of the management and 
relationship building on the contract.  
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